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The role of financial sector in real economic development of a country 
is pivotal. The sector thrives on the financial intermediation process 
through which financial resources are mobilised from different economic 
agents and allocated to the real sectors of an economy. In the era of 
globalisation, its importance has increased manifold because of rapid 
surge in cross border capital flows and their far-reaching implications on 
trade and domestic investment pattern in a developing economy. 
In recent time, the interest in the financial process stems largely from the 
international financial crisis which broke out in 1981-82 and during 
which external credit for the developing countries became increasinglv 
expensive and scarce. As opined by Germidis et al (1991): "The 
consequent transition from strong reliance on external sources of finance 
to domestic financing served to underline the deficiencies and 
inefficiencies of developing countries' financial systems, the active 
development of which had hitherto been overlooked." This is critically 
linked with the presumption that monetary and financial development is 
a prerequisite of economic development and hence, developing countries 
need to undertake special efforts to develop their domestic financial 
systems with the ultimate aim of full integration with the world economy. 
Otherwise, foreign resources channelled through the underdeveloped 
domestic financial systems would in overall be inefficiently allocated. 
This would have serious repercussions on the productivity of foreign 
resources, resulting in periodic problems with repayments. 
The aforesaid hypothesis calls for restoration of market mechanism in the 
domestic financial system by removing all sorts of distortions, held 
responsible for its inefficiency and underdevelopment. And the thrust is 
placed upon financial liberalisation with two principal objectives: to assist 
the macroeconomic stabilisation effort by facilitating transfer of resources 
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towards the traded goods and sen ices sector; and to eliminate the 
distortions in the interest rates, in order to promote efficiency in resource 
allocation and thus facilitate the conditions for sustained growth. This has 
been corroborated by the Shaw-McKinnon hypothesis which advocates 
freeing up interest rates to their market clearing levels and complete 
elimination of administratively determined selective credit allocation. 
The converse of the Shaw-McKinnon view is the hypothesis of "financial 
repression" which stands for below market clearing level interest rates 
and selective credit allocation that follows administrative rather than 
commercial criteria. Other symptoms of financially repressed economies 
include segmentation of the financial market into regulated and 
unregulated segments; disintermediation in the regulated segment; scarcity 
of savings and investment and low capital productivity. It is through 
financial deepening a competitive financial system is facilitated as 
propounded by Shaw (1973) and McKinnon (1973). 
This paper intends to investigate some of the key issues related with the 
hypothesis of financial liberalisation in connection with actual 
experiences of the developing world, notably those located in the South 
East Asian region. Savings interest rate linkage i.e. freeing up interest 
rates from all sorts of regulations and distortions to mop up domestic 
savings in the belief that savings influence investment decisions 
constitutes the principal element of such hypothesis. Investment decisions, 
according to this hypothesis, are guided by the interplay of free market 
forces which ensure efficient allocation of financial resources to the 
different sectors of the economy, more specifically towards the traded 
goods and services sector in the context of domestic macroeconomic 
stabilisation and adjustment efforts. 
In the backdrop of these arguments, it is important to see whether the 
basic tenets of financial liberalisation i.e. savings-interest rate linkage 
holds in the context of a developing economy. Section 1 disembarks upon 
identification of certain key roles and responsibilities of the financial 
intermediation and financial structure which stimulate economic growth 
in a developing economy. This is followed by a critical appraisal of the 
financial liberalisation doctrine in Section 2, to indicate that market 
mechanism may not necessarily lead to efficient allocation of financial 
resources. This is supplemented by some alternative viewpoints in the 
following section which bring into disquisition the contextual necessity 
of sequencing order and regulations in financial sector reform for 
fostering real sector growth in a developing economy, and dwell upon the 
issue of state versus market dominance in the realm of finance, with 
particular reference to the East and South East Asia in recent time. 
In an open economy context, financial liberalisation refers to "financial 
openness" of a domestic economy which in the backdrop of a globalised 
order stands for liberalisation of international capital inflows, and entails 
far-reaching implications for the balance of payments equilibrium, trade 
and domestic investment as well as macroeconomic stability of a 
recipient economy. The surge of private capital flows in the direction of 
developing economies since late eighties, particularly in the form of 
direct and portfolio investment flows, and their impact on trade and 
investment and thereby, on economic growth have gained significance in 
view of the divergent trends across the countries. In this respect, the issue 
which has assumed greater degree of prominence in recent time is the 
issue of current and capital account convertibility. These issues have been 
taken up for discussion in Section 4. Concluding section sums up the 
major observations of this paper. 
Section 1: Financial Intermediation and Economic Growth 
Financial systems ensure the working of a system of payments, mobilise 
savings and improve the allocation of savings to investment. Efficiency 
of a financial system is gauged how in terms of fulfilling these functions, 
it can contribute to real economic growth. A number of studies - notably 
those by Berthelemy and Varoudakis (1996), King and Levine (1993a, b, 
c), Levine (1992a) and Levine and Zevros (1993) - have sought to 
evaluate empirically the contribution of the financial system to growth in 
light of experiences of developing countries across the world. These 
studies are based upon compilation of some indicators regarding the 
volume of financial services produced in'the economy. The construction 
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of synth"!".,; indicators of this type nevertheless presents certain 
difficulties which raise some doubts about the validity of these studies.1 
The above-mentioned studies have corroborated the positive relationship 
between financial depth ratio and economic growth in a number of 
developing economies since sixties.2 However, one interesting fact which 
is missing in them is the initial composition of this financial deepening 
and how it was arrived at in different countries. Also, they do not 
indicate how "efficiency" was garnered in the case of those countries 
where this relationship was found very strong, notably those located in 
East and South East Asia. Table 1 gives an account of financial 
deepening and economic growth in these countries. Moreover, these 
studies do not provide adequate explanation behind weak growth 
dynamics as observed in certain countries. 
Financial liberalisation was advocated in order to garner "efficiency" to 
the financial system where "efficiency" is gauged in terms of its ability 
to realise profits over time and market-determined allocation of resources. 
It is held profitability of the financial system would increase with setting 
the interest rates at their market-clearing levels. The key roles which an 
"efficient" financial system is supposed to play in connection with 
sustainable economic growth are distinguished as evolution of an efficient 
and adaptable system of payments and mobilisation of savings; and 
improvement in resource allocation as . manifested through risk 
diversification, liquidity risk management and project evaluation. Also 
important, in this connection, is the link between the financial structure 
and economic growth to adjudge the efficacies of a market governed 
system as propounded by the advocates of financial liberalisation 
hypothesis. 
1.1: System of payments and mobilisation of savings 
An efficient financial system is characterised by the system of payments 
which is adaptable to the economic growth process over time. In the 
absence of a reliable means of exchange, prohibitive transaction costs 
would tend to cancel out any productivity gains linked to the division of 
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labour and prevent the beginning of any economic growth. Growth 
brings productivity gains, but also the continuous opening up of new 
markets and incessant diversification of the goods traded. The increasing 
complexity of trade brings a growing monetisation of the economy, which 
is necessary in order to sustain the volume of economic activity.3 
Since monetary assets yield poor return, holding such assets entails 
opportunity cost. The need to reduce such costs brings a steady 
movement of the payments system towards credit relations managed by 
the banking intermediaries. This trend is reinforced by technical advances 
which reduce the information costs associated with the use of credits and 
make it easier to create financial assets which can substitute for 
traditional monetary assets. As a result of this, there tends to occur a 
secular increase in the weight of financial activities in GDP and also in 
the percentage of financial sector employment (Kuznets 1971). These 
developments take place simultaneously with economic development. 
Moreover, advances in information technology can counteract with the 
growing monetisation of the economy, measured by the ratio of narrow 
money supply to GDP, after a certain stage of development . However, 
the ratio of broad money aggregates to GDP can register continuous rise 
as it incorporates more sophisticated financial assets (Berthelemy and 
Varoudakis 1996, and Goldsmith 1969). These assets - notably 
commercial bills - can only emerge at certain stage of economic 
development owing to their high cost of utilisation because of which they 
remain inaccessible to a wide range of users in a developing economy. 
Financial intermediaries ensure better mobilisation of the available 
savings by facilitating the agglomeration of the economy's financial 
resources. Through exploiting investment opportunities more efficiently, 
they can provide savers with a relatively higher yield, while at the same 
time contributing directly to a rise in the productivity of capital and 
hence to the acceleration of economic growth. The reorientation of 
savings in investment other than in unprofitable real assets like consumer 
durable can in turn reinforce the deepening of the financial system. 
6 
Financial deepening and rate of savings crucially depend on certain 
policies and macroeconomic factors influencing investment in real sectors 
which in turn generate demand for savings as the East and South East 
Asian experiences suggest. They include (a) maintenance of 
macroeconomic stability leading to positive real interest rates and often 
substantial public savings; (b) policies directly encouraging savings 
through improving regulatory supervision of banks; (c) reduction in 
transaction costs for small savers; (d) protection given to existing 
domestic banks against potential domestic and foreign competitors; (e) 
Governments' direct dealing with distress financial institutions; and (f) 
regulation of deposit and lending rates simultaneously and hence, the 
spreads of the financial intermediaries. Table 2 indicates savings and 
investment rates in some of these countries in the region. These policies 
with respect to savings contributed to the high rates of investment in 
these economies. Also, these countries encouraged investment with a 
wide array of other mechanisms designed to increase the attractiveness 
of private investment such as low corporate taxes, low pricing of capital 
goods etc. In addition, the Governments in East and South East Asia 
attempted to allocate credit directly to the priority sectors, which goes 
against the objective of market-governed financial system. 
1.2: Improvement in resource allocation - risk diversification, 
liquidity risk management and project evaluation 
Along with mobilisation of financial resources, the quality of their 
allocation to various investment projects is equally an important factor for 
economic growth. Difficulties arise in the allocation of resources to 
investment projects connected with productivity risks, incomplete 
information regarding future returns from the investments and imperfect 
knowledge of the entrepreneurs' real abilities. In this context, the role of 
financial intermediation process is better analysed in terms of risk ; 
diversification, liquidity risk management and project evaluation. 
j 
Owing to the presence of productivity risks connected with incomplete 
information regarding the quality of investment projects, returns on them 5 
are uncertain which may exert adverse effects on resource allocation as 
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a) risk-averse agents tend to hold substantial part of their wealth in less 
isky liquid assets which are mostly unproductive (Levine 1991, 1992a); 
nd (b) it may lead to inefficient technological choices. It is generally 
resumed that more nsky technologies bear a higher expected yield. 
n a developing economy, investment-return risks are often diversified by 
;dopting less specialised and hence, less productive technologies owing 
o the absence of proper financial intermediation process which would 
uarantee reduction in productivity risks while using more productive 
pecialised technologies.4 
Janking intermediaries and stock markets play important role in 
liversifying these productivity risks of investments. Stock markets 
acilitate this risk diversification process based upon market principles 
vhereas banking intermediaries by diversifying their own portfolios 
;uarantee returns to their clients. However, stocks are themselves subject 
o market risks in developed as well developing economies in terms of 
requent fluctuations in their prices and yield. 
financial intermediation is also vital in connection with liquidity risk 
vhich arises as some productive investments are highly illiquid in terms 
if reduction in their yield whenever premature sale of these assets take 
ilace. The risk associated with investment with high gestation period 
iften creates demand for liquidity which, in the absence of a proper 
inancial intermediation process, discourages such investment which 
vould otherwise be of vital importance from the developmental point of 
iew. 
rinancial intermediaries allow the economy as a whole to manage these 
iquidity risk factors by permitting economic agents, who suffer from 
uch liquidity shocks, to engage in exchanges with other agents. In a 
leveloping economy such exchanges are of paramount importance as 
aost of the development projects suffer from such liquidity risk.5 As 
lointed out by Levine (1991), liquidity risks can also be managed by 
tock markets which make exchanges possible between agents who suffer 
rom liquidity shocks and those not suffering from such shocks but 
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intending to increase their share of productive assets in their wealth. ! 
From the point of view of ensuring expected yield from a particular : 
investment project, it is important to gather information on the ' 
competence of the entrepreneurs and expected future return on the : 
projects. However, collection of such information entails a fixed cost ! 
which generally tends to dissuade individual investors from undertaking : 
such project evaluation activities themselves. Financial intermediaries f 
reduce this cost of information collection on behalf of the individual 
investors by spreading the fixed cost among many. Also, a financial 1 
intermediation system may constitute a network linking different 
economic agents facilitating the transmission of information on the : 
profitability of individual investment projects. • 
1J: Role of Financial Structure ' 
A well developed financial structure comprises money and capital market : 
along with banking and non-banking intermediaries which play crucial ' 
role in investment financing. In this regard, the historical experiences of 1 
the developed industrialised economies are diverse. In USA and UK, [ 
capital market (equity and bond markets) played much greater role in 1 
mobilising funds for investment whereas in Germany and Japan this ' 
responsibility was delegated to the universal banking system.6 The ! 
experiences of the developing economies are much more diverse than the ' 
developed countries. In recent time, a significant share of investment 1 
finance in developing Asia is coming from the stock market. In the case 1 
of developed economies at their early stages of development, internal 1 
funds constituted the principal proportion of their fixed capital formation 
whereas in the case of developing Asia external sources contributed 
significantly. During eighties the contribution of external sources to the 1 
fixed capital formation was well over 50%. In the case of Korean big 1 
enterprises it reached almost 90% (Singh 1992). 
In the context of a developing economy, the capital market may 1 
encounter certain comparative disadvantages with respect to the banking ' 
system. Firstly, in the presence of high productivity risks, asymmetiy of 1 
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^formation between lenders and borrowers and costly monitoring 
Process debt contracts with fixed repayment schedule will tend to prevail 
,ver the equity financing which is subject to periodic payments of 
lividends constrained by productivity shocks. The advantages of the 
,anking intermediaries over the securities market are also based on their 
reater efficiency in gathering costly information and reducing monitoring 
'osts As pointed out by Diamond (1984), banking intermediaries can 
• uarantee a fixed return on their deposits with their large and diversified 
nvestment portfolios and by minimising the monitoring costs which are 
ncurred only in the case of bankruptcy.. 
ioth banks and capital markets perform the tasks of nsk diversification 
ind liquidity risk management, adaptation and enforcement of control 
nechanism to garner better resource management and project evaluation. 
3anks are better placed than the bonds and equities market when it 
:omes to diversification of investment risks. Capital markets exert control 
)ver the productive resource management through the mechanism of 
nergers and acquisitions. Berthelemy and Varoudakis (1996) opmed that 
ncentives for sound management discipline can be effected through 
nerger and takeover in the case of oligopolistic enterprises where the 
narket cannot efficiently perform selection function. However, takeover 
md merger mechanism may generate unproductive investments whose 
mn is to create a size effect as a form of protection against hostile 
akeover and also may infuse "short-termism" in the capital market in 
erms of such mergers and acquisition (Singh 1992). This may lead to 
-eduction in attractiveness of long term projects necessary for increasing 
he productivity of capital and thereby, accelerating economic growth. 
\ s mentioned above, banks perform the task of project evaluation better 
than the capital market by minimising the fixed cost of monitoring and 
ensuring returns on investment. It is, however, alleged that capital market, 
which is based upon market governed principles, carries out this function 
better than banks in terms of continuous appraisal of the enterprises and 
their investment projects especially in an imperfect market. Allen (1993) 
3rgued that monitoring by banks can only be optimal in a competitive 
snvironment where production lead times are relatively short and the pace 
y 
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of technical progress is slow. But the presence of information constraints 
may jeopardise efficient functioning of capital market in particular and 
market governed mechanism in general even in an imperfect market 
situation. At this juncture, this raises the issue of efficacy of market-
governed system over state controlled system - the discussion of which 
is taken up in the following section. 
Section 2 : Financial Liberalisation - A Critical Appraisal 
As said at the onset, financial liberalisation gained momentum following 
international financial crisis which surfaced in 1982 with the debt-ridden 
countries started undertaking domestic adjustment programme at the 
dictum of the multilateral agencies. In the East and South East Asia, 
however, interest in financial process stemmed from their export-led 
growth dynamics which created demand for financial openness with the 
relocation of foreign capital flows and industries within the region. In the 
theoretical plane, financial liberalisation doctrine was advanced to 
eliminate prevailing distortions in the financial market, which include 
high reserve requirements, interest rate controls and selective credit 
allocation. Two most notable features of financial liberalisation 
hypothesis include savings-interest rate linkage and interest rate 
deregulation. 
2.1: Savings-interest linkage 
The central element of financial liberalisation hypothesis is based upon 
savings-interest rate link. As market takes care of allocation and thereby, 
of investment in the "productive" sectors, the onus of financial 
intermediation process falls on "increased" mobilisation of savings via the 
interest rate mechanism. It is held replacing artificially held below market 
clearing low interest rates by higher market determined interest rates 
would encourage savers to save more in liquid financial assets. In this 
respect, no distinction has been made about the savers' type which 
include household, private corporate sectors and government, and also, 
of their different motives for savings. 
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There does not exist much of theoretical and empirical evidence which 
confirms strong link between savings and interest in a developing 
economy.7 The effect of rise in interest rate on savings is not easy to 
determine because of the presence of income and substitution effects on 
savings generated by a rise in interest rate. Savings increase if and only 
if positive substitution effects of rise in interest rate outweighs negative 
income effect. Moreover, it is the composition of savings than its volume 
which undergoes change in response to rise in interest rate as a shift 
tends to occur from savings in physical assets to financial assets. 
Real interest rate is one of the many variables which affect savings 
behaviour in a developing economy. The variables other than interest rate 
are institutional in nature and signify the importance of financial structure 
in mobilising financial resources from different economic agents. For 
example, the expansion of banking in rural areas in East and South East 
Asian economies since sixties played a crucial role in tapping investible 
resources from the rural households in these economies. Private and 
public savings are also influenced by certain macroeconomic variables 
like fiscal position of the government, external indebtedness, rate of 
inflation and population dependency ratios (Fry 1991; and James et.al 
1989). 
2.2: Interest rate deregulation 
Early proponents of the financial liberalisation hypothesis held interest 
rates below market clearing levels discouraged savings and also distorted 
the choice of investment projects (McKinnon 1973; and Shaw 1973). 
However, the experiences of financial liberalisation across the world 
hollowed this earlier viewpoint. Financial liberalisation in some countries 
aggravated both macroeconomic instability and financial fragility at least 
in the immediate short run.8 
The development of market failure literature weakened the logical basis 
of the interest control argument which pointed out that markets are also 
susceptible to major inefficiencies in allocation of resources owing to the 
presence of asymmetric information leading to adverse selection of risk 
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and moral hazard syndrome (Stiglitz .1993). In the presence of 
asymmetric information, competitive credit market may not always clear 
with equilibria being characterised bv credit rationing (Stiglitz and Weiss 
1981). 
In a competitive credit market, interest rate affects the excess demand for 
loans as well as the average quality of lenders' loan portfolio. With rise 
in interest rate, the quality of loan portfolio deteriorates due to adverse 
selection of risks and moral hazard problem. Adverse selection takes 
place as sound borrowers are discouraged relative to unsound borrowers 
when interest rate rises. Moral hazard problem crops up as all borrowers 
have an incentive to undertake riskier project with rise in interest rate 
with the underlying presumption that riskier projects yield higher returns. 
Therefore, a divergence occurs between interest rate which clears market 
and that which maximises lenders' return. This results in credit rationing 
if the interest rate which maximises lenders' return is less than the market 
clearing interest rate. 
Credit rationing argument, in a way, vindicates the inefficiencies of free 
market outcome in the presence of asymmetric information. The 
government may, however, face the same information constraint and 
worsen the situation by imposing an interest rate ceiling below the credit 
rationing equilibrium. In the presence of asymmetric information, the free 
market equilibrium is not constrained Pareto efficient (Greenwald and 
Stiglitz 1986). Moreover, optimum government intervention depends on 
certain factors like mean, and variance of projects which are not easy to 
identify (DeMeza and Webb 1987). Note that credit rationing argument 
and hence, the market failure logic rests upon borrowers' intention only. 
The case for government intervention from the point of view of credit 
rationing argument can be developed if moral hazard and adverse 
selection hypotheses are extended to the lenders. Financial institutions 
may become risk lovers as well in a free market devoid of any control 
and regulatory mechanism.9 This is because in a favourable situation they 
can reap large profits whereas in adverse situation they simply w?alk away 
from the losses as they are to be borne by the monetary authority. In a 
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state-controlled economy also, the danger exists as losses are borne by 
the state, which is the owner of the financial intermediaries, and leads to 
an adverse fiscal impact and macroeconomic instability. These dangers 
are intensified by financial liberalisation as financial intermediaries obtain 
greater freedom with respect to interest rates and direction of credit. 
Table 3 gives an account of interest rate regime between two sub-periods 
1971-80 and 1981-90 for some East and South East Asian countries. Of 
the eight countries, financial reform was initiated in five countries. 
Barring China and Taiwan, increase in savings ratio m no other countries 
led to investment efficiency. In China, savings ratio did not register any 
rise. Moreover, interest rate regime in most of these countries remained 
positive except for Hong Kong. 
2.3: Real-financial linkage 
Excessive rise in interest rate following financial liberalisation may create 
problems for the real sector and results in financial distress. The situation 
may culminate into total financial collapse as the Latin American 
experience suggests. In an open economy having international trade and 
financial linkages and characterised by high inflationary expectations, 
exchange risk and oligopolistic financial markets (which are the salient 
features of most of the Southern Cone countries) deregulation of interest 
rates may accentuate the distress of the real sector even more. 
Given the Latin American and East Asian experiences, early viewpoint 
regarding financial liberalisation was modified and replaced by a 
sequencing argument of the order of such liberalisation so as to avert any 
macroeconomic instability (McKinnon 1989, 1991). The revised 
viewpoint calls for imposition of prudential regulation and supervision on 
financial intermediaries to take care of the adverse selection and moral 
hazard problem. It states that some interest control at least in the short 
run is desirable to prevent any macroeconomic disorder and distress in 
the real sector and interest rate deregulation need to be pursued after 
macro management being set in order. 
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As far as the real financial sector link is concerned, it is not very easy to 
determine which way the causality runs. Both demand and supply driven 
explanations can be advanced in establishing the causality.10 The 
experiences of different developing countries across the world in the post 
world war era suggest that causality may undergo changes over the 
course of economic development (Jung 1986). Financial expansion, being 
initially sparked off by real sector growth, at a later stage, supports a real 
growth process by supplying necessary financial inputs and services to 
the real sectors in an economy. Financial reform generally takes place at 
this later stage of development. This is most pronounced in the case of 
East and South East Asian economies where financial sector reform was 
pursued in response to the growing needs of real sector, most notably the 
expanding export sector. 
Section 3: State versus Market in Financial Sector Reform 
The underlying premises of the financial liberalisation hypothesis rest on 
the neoclassical theme of laissez faire. In neoclassical view, government 
intervention is justified only to correct market failures resulting from 
externalities, dynamic rigidities, market power, and incomplete or missing 
markets. Thus the government may intervene only if the benefits of the 
intervention outweigh the costs of interfering with the market." 
3.1: A genesis of government failure arguments 
The recent spate of enthusiasm in free market mechanism as opposed to 
state intervention negates the belief that where market fails the 
government should intervene: "From the correct observation that free 
markets often fail it is an easy but erroneous step to conclude that where 
the. market fails the government ought to step in" (Basu 1992). 
This revival of neoclassical hypothesis has its origin in the economic 
crisis of the last two decades, which often has undermined confidence in 
the interventionist policies in the West in the immediate post-war era. As 
Banuri (1991) opined: "During this period, the example of centrally 
planned economies lost some of its appeal as they began to run into 
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serious economic and social difficulties of their own. At the same time, 
Western countries witnessed an erosion of the Keynesian consensus and 
a growing criticism of stabilization policies, labour unions, social welfare 
institutions, and regulation of industrial and financial enterprises." 
Literature dealing with governmental failure - a public sector analogue 
of private sector market failure - was developed during this period as an 
antidote to the belief that when market works less than perfectly 
governmental intervention automatically improves the situation. The 
fundamental argument runs in the cost-benefit framework which shows 
that the governments are likely to face similar problems if it intervenes. 
This faith in market mechanism in recent time received boost from 
supply-side economics which constituted the theoretical underpinnings of 
the policies embraced in the early eighties by the Reagan administration 
in US (Nell 1984). Supply-side economists considered capitalism a 
natural and progressive form, expressing the individualism inherent in 
human nature and offering balanced economic growth in terms of the 
"harmonious equilibrating mechanisms of the free market". They invoked 
Say's Law to justify their exclusive focus on the incentives to supply. 
Neoclassical theories of the supply of and demand for labour were 
espoused. Government operations were held as largely harmful or 
useless. Inflation was thought to be ended by reinstatement of the 
principles of gold standard. More particularly, according to this view, 
taxes drove a "wedge" between the price a buyer must pay and the price 
that seller receives. With regard to the labour market, mcome and social 
security taxes constitute such a wedge which reduces both the amount 
of labour supplied and demanded. The policy recommendations, which 
followed from it, were aimed at drastic cut in governmental activities. 
Tax rates were reduced sharply on the presumption that it would provide 
greater incentives to work, save and invest. Governmental programmes 
were cut and all kinds of regulations on business and industry were done 
away with. 
During the immediate post-war era in the capitalist West, "the rise of 
Keynesianism, the increasing legitimacy of social welfare institutions and 
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labour unions, and the acceptance of the need to regulate financial 
institutions provided justifications for interventionist policies and 
weakened the ideological support of the Western example for the free 
trade policies in the Third World" (Banuri 1991). As a contrast, the 
economic crisis of the last two decades, the downfall of the socialist bloc, 
the success of export-led economic regimes of the East and South East 
Asia, the emergence of supply-side economics and the public choice 
theoretic literature dealing with 'governmental failure' seem to hav6 
provided justification for the loss of confidence in government 
intervention. 
3.2: Market failure arguments 
. The underlying premises of the liberalisation doctrine include the faith 
that (a) market mechanism would replace state intervention; (b) private 
investment would substitute public investment; (c) direct and portfolio 
foreign investment would be a substitute for debt creating capital inflows. 
Shaw (1973) opined that "financial repression" is part of a package which 
entails distortion not only in the financial market but also in foreign 
exchange markets, in the trade regime, in labour and goods market in 
general and generates macroeconomic instability. Therefore, removal of 
distortions in financial system without corresponding reform of distortions 
in the other markets stands for the "restoration of the classical theoiy of 
second best". However, this viewpoint abstracts from the problems arising 
out of market failure which could afflict financial system. Such failures 
stem from a number of sources including externalities, exercise of 
monopoly power by dominant banks and information asymmetries 
between borrowers and lenders (Kay and Vickers 1988). 
Externalities causing market failure are associated with the risk of 
systemic failure and infection effect. Systemic failure may afflict the 
banking system if bank failures are correlated with the actual or 
threatened failure in one case raising the risk of failure of another. 
Infection effect results in when excessive competition leads to lowering 
. in product and price standards. Moreover, as Vittas (1992) pointed out 
excessive competition may indulge dominant firms to exercise monopoly 
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power through excessive price-cost margins and erection of entry barriers 
to the overall detriment of dynamic as well as static efficiency. Stiglitz 
(1989) opined that in the presence of adverse selection of risks and moral 
hazard problem, interest rates generally tend to overshoot to cover the 
default risk and thereby, crowd out low-risk projects with high, ex-ante 
social rates of return. The problem of interest rate overshooting was 
evidenced in the case of Southern Cone countries during seventies. In the 
presence of macroeconomic instability, such information asymmetries 
may be more acute because of the risk of systemic failure. This was 
recognised by McKinnon (1984), an early advocate of financial 
liberalisation. 
Given the experiences of the financial collapse in the Southern Cone 
countries, attention was laid upon sequencing of reforms which marked 
departure from earlier approach (McKinnon 1988). The sequencing logic 
advocates that domestic financial sector reform should be preceded by 
reform in trade and exchange rate regime and followed by liberalisation 
of capital account (McKinnon 1982; Edwards 1984). But it is not clear 
how far this logic is relevant today in the context of (a) changing pattern 
of external private capital flows which are subject to volatile fluctuations 
and (b) the experiences of the South East Asian countries during eighties, 
notably Indonesia, where sequencing was associated with some external 
costs.12 
3.3: State vs. market - a synthesis 
The arguments regarding financial liberalisation essentially boil down to 
the arguments regarding state versus market dominance in the realm of 
finance. In this respect, following Zysman (1983), two types of financial 
system can be distinguished - capital-based and credit-based financial 
system. In a capital-based financial system, securities (stocks and bonds) 
constitute the principal source of business finance where borrowers can 
choose from a wide spectrum of capital and money market instruments 
offered through a large number of financial institutions. In a credit-based 
financial system, as capital market is generally weak firms heavily rely 
upon credits from financial intermediaries, notably banks. Dependence of 
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firms on government in a state-based system stems from the fact that the 
banks themselves are heavily dependent on government.13 Hence, in a 
credit-based system, which is dominated by state, credit allocation is 
subject to governmental decision with firms often exhibiting high debt-
equity ratios. Most of the East and South-East Asian economies fall in 
this category. Debt-equity ratios, which are generally below 100 per cent 
in the advanced countries, were 300-400 per cent in Korea and 100-200 
per cent in Taiwan as compared to 100-120 per cent in Brazil and 
Mexico during seventies.14 In fact, in Korea, even after financial 
deregulation in 1983, state dominance over the banking system was 
retained through personal policies, appointment of senior managers and 
range of services. In Taiwan, entire banking system until recently was 
owned by the state. 
Certain distinct advantages of the state-dominated credit-based financial 
system over the market-governed capital-based system can be 
distinguished at this juncture. They include investment requirements in 
a developing economy and the control apparatus necessary for 
implementation of a particular industrialisation strategy. A state-based 
system allows faster investment in those projects which are of utmost 
significance from the developmental point of view but which geneally 
does not attract funds from capital market. Also, it provides a safeguard 
to productive investment against stock market speculations resulting in 
periodic booms and busts. Capital-based system is generally guided by 
short-term profitability, as noted down by Singh (1992). In the case of 
state controlled system, where long-term performance of the firms 
becomes the principal consideration and hence, firms, being not guided 
by the short-term speculative concern of the stock market, are better 
placed in terms of being able to adhere to a long-term strategy 
concerning technology, new product development, cost-competitiveness 
and so on. Furthermore, a state-based system permits the government to 
exert its political will and vision to implement its own industrialisation 
strategy. 
In fact, state-based financial system is an essential feature of successful 
economies characterised by late industrialisation process. East Asian 
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economies, notably Korea and Taiwan, are classic examples in this 
respect as noted by Amsden (1989, 1991). In these countries, state-based 
financial system facilitated discriminatory use of selective credit 
allocation and thereby, augmented the pace of industrialisation which 
would otherwise not have been possible. 
However, in a state-based system, danger lies if it provokes a subsidy-
mentality resulting in wasteful rent-seeking behaviour. This can be 
avoided, as in the case of East and South-East Asian economies, by 
adherence to strict performance criteria of the firms. Theoretically, 
socially profitable investments in industries and socially desirable sectors 
are possible using such criteria if they are based upon good 
approximations of ex ante social rates of return. 
In the theoretical plane, information asymmetries leading to market 
failure has provided fillip to state-dominated credit-based financial 
system. The theoretical logic runs in terms of transaction cost economics 
and is termed as internal market hypothesis. It was developed in the 
course of analysing Korean state and its financial system vis-a-vis its 
large enterprises (Lee 1992). When information asymmetries are high and 
pervasive, firms generally rely upon "internal capital", comprising funds 
generated through their retained earnings and/or out of depreciation 
charges. In a state-dominated credit-based financial system, state, 
operating as a de facto internal capital market, minimises the risk of 
information asymmetries. State generally develops a long-term 
relationship with the borrowing firms. Lender monitoring as well as risk 
management and project evaluation, which are some of the key functions 
of an efficient financial system as indicated in Section 1, are carried out 
much more effectively in such a system by the "atmosphere of mutual 
trusts and co-operation" (Lee 1992). 
Section 4: Financial Openness and Liberalised International 
Capital Flows 
Financial liberalisation process, in essence, is geared towards the issues 
of financial openness of the domestic financial sector in connection with 
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trade and foreign capital flows with the rest of the world. Deregulation 
of international capital flows including foreign direct and portfolio 
investment flows, and particularly convertibility of capital account, 
remained at the heart of the financial openness in the developing 
countries. As per the advocates of such openness, its basic rationale lies 
in securing benefits of full integration with the world economy. It is 
envisaged that a fully liberalised capital account would ensure 
optimisation of savings and investment as well as full risk diversification. 
It is held that promoting integration of capital markets would allow the 
residents of each country to diversify their more risky investments 
internationally which would imply allocation of more resources to risky 
investments, presuming that more risky technologies bear higher expected 
yield, and thereby, would stimulate growth of the world economy 
(Obstfeld 1994). 
The major concern with liberalisation of capital flows is the risk of 
volatile inflows and outflows which may destabilise the real as well as 
the financial sector in a developing economy. Danger of excessive capital 
inflows is that they can lead directly or indirectly to an excessive 
expansion of bank balance-sheets in terms of (a) deterioration in credit 
quality as banks increase their risk exposure and (b) maturity mismatch 
with long term investments being matched by short term deposits thereby, 
leading to debt explosion after certain period of time. Hence, the 
advocates of financial openness argue that a gradual and cautious 
approach should be followed in opening up the financial sector. 
The most critical danger of capital account convertibilty lies in the 
international transmission of shocks from one country to another. Recent 
surges in portfolio investment in the developing countries have intensified 
this possibility further as the experiences of Latin American and South 
East Asian economies in very recent time indicate. As opined by Sen 
(1996a), the impending danger of transmission of shocks from one market 
to another stems from a variety of factors including decline in interest 
rates in the major industrialised countries, notably US, a greater degree 
of volatility of stock prices in developing country financial markets as 
compared to those prevailing in the more advanced countries, a negative 
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correlation between stock prices in industrialised countries and those in 
emerging markets, and the tendency to low growth or stagnation in the 
developed regions making the emerging markets more attractive to 
international portfolio managers. 
The international dimension of the policies regarding financial openness 
in the developing world stems largely from the development in the 
advanced economies in connection with financial deregulation therein, 
along with the international financial crisis caused by the large 
developing country debt overhang in eighties. This increased the fragility 
of the financial system in general and banking system in particular in the 
advanced countries during eighties, which was more accentuated with 
slowdown of economic growth and the declining trend of the interest 
income of the banks there. In the face of the competitive challenges 
from the non-bank financial intermediaries which accounted for a large 
share of gross bank income and growing funding costs, banks' interest 
margin was squeezed substantially during eighties.15 As a result, the 
share of non-interest income grew rapidly while that of the interest 
income fell continuously over the decade. Table 4 gives an account of the 
rising trend of the non-interest income of the international banks as share 
of their annual gross income in the six major developed countries in 
eighties. One of the basic factors influencing the growth in non-interest 
income of the banks was that in eighties the banks increasingly got 
involved in activities other than the normal banking activities of deposit 
taking and credit extension owing to deregulation of finance in the major 
industrialised countries.16 These included underwriting services, provision 
of back-up facilities and other advisoiy services which earned them fee 
income. Interest rate margins were sometimes adversely affected because 
of mismatches as long term loans were often matched by short term 
deposits. This was the case with the US money centre and small regional 
banks which had its severe repercussion on the US loan and investment 
industry in eighties. As a result of this, the pre-tax profits of the US 
banks became negative in 1988 ($ -11.6 billion) from $ 6 billion in 
1985.17 
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In the six major financial centres, noted m Table 4, the pre-tax profits 
declined as proportion of the banks' gross income over the decade with 
a notable exception of the Japanese banks.IS Operating costs absorbed the 
major portion of the banks' gross income - Swiss banks being the only 
exception. However, the Japanese banks could maintain their profit level 
because of their low loan loss provisions. German and French banks were 
better ofT than their counterparts in the US and UK as they had already 
made substantial loan loss provisions earlier, although the cost efficiency 
of the German and French banks deteriorated during eighties. Banks in 
the US and UK were compelled to step up their provisions in late 
eighties which sharply cut back into their net earnings. In Japan, the 
actual fear was with regard to the potential financial fragility, rather than 
actual one, following the steep drop in stock and real estate prices in the 
end of 1989.19 Earlier Japan experienced a strong "asset inflation". Thus 
it was expected that the growth of foreign assets of Japanese banks would 
be reduced in the aftermath of the stock market plunge of 1990 which 
had made them to lose an estimated $ 200 billion of their aggregate 
capital. 
The perception that banks had become more vulnerable to the financial 
ups and downs had provoked regulatory responses across the countries 
and also called for a harmonised system of bank supervision 
internationally in the late eighties. The US and UK banks were more 
vulnerable than their European counterparts in terms of deterioration of 
their asset quality. By 1990-91, therefore, as a result of this and also, as 
a result of BIS capital adequacy norms, most of the international banks 
cutting across regions reduced their external asset profile substantially 
including their third world debt assets. Rather, more emphasis was laid 
upon risk-sensitive pricing, which reflected higher margins on corporate 
loans. Different debt conversion instruments helped the banks in reducing 
their developing country debt exposures, and simultaneously, allowed 
them to diversify their asset portfolio. 
Developing country loan asset profile of the international banks was 
greatly reduced by 1990. The proportion of non-performing assets to 
gross loans declined substantially.20 The banks rather got involved in 
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corporate lending including arranging mergers and acquisition for the 
corporate sector, real estate transactions and equity business.21 
Deregulation of finance in major creditor countries gave fillip to the off-
balance-sheet activities of the commercial banks since mid-eighties. 
Banks started using derivative over the counter instruments (OTC) 
including warrants, asset-based securities (ABS) etc. These operations 
were no less risky than their developing country lending business in the 
seventies.22 
In 1990, the size of the international equity market swelled to $2315.1 
billion as a result of a near 50% surge in the value of cross-exchange 
trading.23 The early nineties witnessed a shift in the pattern of cross-
border equity flows from within the OECD countries to the emerging 
markets in Asia and Latin America. Major investing institutions, such as 
pension and insurance funds in Europe and other countries in OECD, 
were the key intermediaries of these cross-border capital flows, not banks 
or multinational companies. Net equity flows rose from $4 billion in 1987 
to $51 billion in 1991, while cross-exchange trading rose from $508.6 
billion in 1987 to $873.9 billion in 1990.24 Cross-exchange trading as per 
cent of total foreign share trading increased from 27.4% in 1987 to 
37.7% in 1990. If in the seventies the non-securitised assets, mainly bank 
deposits, formed the main source of global capital flows the same can be 
said about the securitised assets since the late eighties. 
In the context of financial deregulation in the major developed countries 
in the eighties, the distinction between banking, insurance, investment 
management trusts and securities have become blurred. Profitability 
became a problem among all the financial firms stretching from securities 
firms to banks and insurance. As a result of financial deregulation, the 
credit cycle of rapid expansion and contraction has been deepened and 
broadened and now has penetrated into all areas of financial services. 
Deregulation has heightened volatility. Banking franchises were lost and 
banks entered into markets with products they hardly understood. Reserv e 
requirements changed. Business became more risky with tremendous rise 
in volatility, caused primarily by short-term nature of global capital 
flows. The junk bond market in the US, the equity warrant market in 
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Japan, and short-term bank loans in the UK and Australia have soured. 
From the late eighties, there were moves away from the highly 
competitive, low margin areas towards specialisation. In international 
banking, there was a return to "relationship" business.25 On the other 
hand, by the late eighties international policy makers,,such as the BIS, 
started their efforts to slow down the effects of deregulation26. Global 
regulation has been strengthened to counter the risks stemming from 
more intense domestic financial competition. 
In 1991, most of the banks met the BIS capital adequacy requirements.27 
The improvement in capital ratios of the US money centre banks was 
attained through decreasing the high risk weighted assets of developing 
country and real estate loans. The US banks' capital asset ratio rose from 
10.17% in the first quarter of 1991 to 10.78% in the third quarter of 
1991. Japanese banks' capital ratio during the same period rose from 
8.32% to 8.58%. This was largely attributed to an increase in the amount 
of subordinated debt raised in the stock and bond markets. 
To a large extent international banking regulation, and also, creditor 
country regulation provided a protective umbrella to banks holding risky 
asset portfolio. Deregulation of finance at home had led to the banks' 
involvement in non-bank activities and at the same time it increased the 
competition from non-bank intermediaries. Third World debt exposure, 
also, raised the potential inter-bank rivalry and competition among banks 
(especially between large and small banks) for receiving shares of debt 
payments. Banking regulation came into force to meet these imminent 
needs of the banking sector. Deregulation of finance at home led to an 
end to the creditors' cartel of early eighties as the inter-bank fierce 
competition increased (for example, between Japanese and US banks). 
The impact of all these was felt through the declining profits of the banks 
and rising proportion of riskier ventures which aroused the demand from 
the financial intermediaries including the banks to seek re-regulation at 
the international level, and rapid growth in foreign exchange trading 
related with cross-border capital flows including direct and portfolio 
investment and bank loans in the direction of emerging markets of Asia 
and Latin America. Capital mobility across the border is manifested in 
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rapid growth in foreign exchange trading which more than doubled 
during 1986-89, a rate of expansion much faster than that of international 
trade in goods and services. By 1989, global foreign exchange trading is 
estimated to have amounted to $ 650 billion daily, almost forty times the 
average daily value of world trade (BIS 1990b). 
Net resource flows to the developing world, as indicated in Tables 5 and 
6, registered sharp rise since 1990 with developing Asia receiving the 
lion's share. Investment flows including FDI and portfolio equity flows 
constitute the principal form of such capital flows to the developing Asia. 
Such capital flows in the direction of emerging markets in Asia have 
raised major concern in connection with corresponding balance of 
payment vulnerability' arising out of a mismatch between investment 
income liabilities and capital account inflows. The problem has been 
accentuated by deteriorating terms of trade in the current account of these 
economies caused by drop in unit prices of exportable for most of the 
emerging economies in East and South East Asia (Sen 1996a). Steady 
increase in investment income liabilities and short-term portfolio and debt 
flows have raised the vulnerability further as such capital flows are 
subject to market, credit and exchange risks as the experiences of 
Southern Cone countries and financial deregulation in the advanced 
countries in the eighties suggest. 
Market risks are most acute in the case of portfolio investments in terms 
of fluctuation in prices of equities and bonds, and also, in terms of yield 
in the case of equities. Given the thinness of stock markets in South East 
Asian economies, such danger has become real as the recent 
developments in Thailand suggest. Credit risks are associated with short 
term debt flows which may arise due to mis-matched liabilities and/or 
deteriorating external payment capacity of the borrowing countries 
resulting in a low credit rating in the international capital market - the 
lesson to be drawn from the Latin American debt imbroglio in the 
eighties. Moreover, most of these short-term capital flows are subject to 
exchange risks in terms of fluctuation in exchange rate leading to 
unanticipated capital flights from the host economies as the Mexican 
experience in 1994 indicates. In fact, there lies danger with sudden influx 
of capital to an economy culminating into a Dutch disease syndrome in 
r 
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terms of an appreciating exchange rate exerting pressure on current 
account balance. 
Advocates of'financial openness have opined that "the resolution of 
market failure that afflicts financial systems needs an appropriate 
regulatory framework" (Islam and Chowdhury 1997). Table 7 gives an 
account of such prudential and other regulation which are regarded 
essential for "stable, efficient and fair financial system". In the East and 
South East Asian context, such regulations were necessary to restore 
public confidence in the financial system as the onset of more liberal 
financial regime in the early eighties in these economies triggered off 
bank failures and widespread financial fraudulence. These regulations 
vindicate the crucial significance of an effective surveillance. at the 
national level of monetary and fiscal goals of price stability and credit 
allocation to achieve a diversified product base in this region. However, 
in the face of a potential withdrawal of portfolio investments in these 
economies the ability to enforce regulatory instruments may prove 
inadequate. Because when the state attempts to thwart any danger of 
financial instability money is transferred through the informal curb 
markets to the relatively free markets in the neighbouring countries as the 
experiences of South East Asian countries suggest. Both portfolio equity 
and foreign direct investment flows are subject to similar insecurity when 
credit standing of an economy declines in the international capital market 
with ensuing capital flight. That credit standing and market position of 
an economy, whose external economic dimension is fairly stable, may 
deteriorate in the face of a financial collapse in the region because of its 
being located in a crisis prone region was evidenced in the Latin 
American debt crisis in the eighties with Peru being the classic example 
(Cline 1983). 
Section 5: Conclusions 
Summing up the major observations made in this paper, it can be said 
that prophecies of financial liberalisation as a means to achieve growth 
via allocative efficiency and that of financial openness as a means to 
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rejuvenate effectiveness of monetary policy by permitting the free play 
of all markets was not fulfilled neither in the advanced nor in the 
developing economies. The success stones of the East and South East 
Asian economies m this respect, however, signify a particular role of 
state characterised by its strong will and discriminatory allocative 
mechanism and not the supremacy of market forces. However, in the face 
of international transmission of shocks in terms of potential capital 
outflows from the region, state's regulatory mechanism may become 
ineffective as the experiences of these economies tend to suggest. This 
fear has become real in recent time with financial downswing in the 
major South East Asian economies including Thailand, Malaysia and 
Indonesia and increased frequency of stock price fluctuations in the 
region. 
Loopholes exist in a state-controlled financial system in connection with 
inter-linked domestic credit markets m a developing economy. Any 
analysis and policy imperatives relating financial market development in 
a developing economy must provide more focussed attention on informal 
segments of the market. A strong presence of informal market mechanism 
in the overall financial system of a country may frustrate any attempt to 
regulate or deregulate it effectively and ma}- render credit diversion 
expensive as the Korean experience m the early seventies suggests. But 
the later developments in Korea and other emerging economies m the 
East and South East Asian region prove that a strong-willed state is 
capable of overcoming the inefficiencies of private capital market without 
corresponding risk of government failure. 
The recent debacle of the South East Asian economies once again has 
brought to the fore the pertinence of the market failure arguments in a 
globalised context. As a noted exception to this debacle, Taiwan and 
China tend to reaffirm the supremacy of "state-dominance" over "market-
governed" system. 
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T a b l e 1 
F i n a n c i a l D e e p e n i n g and Interes t R a t e R e g i m e 
in Se lec ted A s i a - P a c i f i c E c o n o m i e s 
( 1 9 7 1 - 8 0 vs . 1 9 8 0 - 9 0 ) 
Economy M2/GDP (%) M2/GDP (%) Interest rate 
1971-80 1981-90 regime (real 
rate:+/-ve) 
Hong Kong 85.7 
Korea 33.7 
Singapore 61.7 
Taiwan 58.1 
Indonesia 16.1 
Malaysia 44.2 
Thailand 35.8 
155 -ve (1973-91) 
36.8 -ve* (1971-90) 
78.8 +ve (1977-91) 
110.2 +ve (1974-91) 
24.3 +ve**(197090) 
88.2 +ve (1976-91) 
57.6 +ve (1977-90) 
Note: * During 1973-79 and 1981-83 -ve 
** During 1973-76 -ve 
Source: Islam and Chowdhury (1997); p.75. 
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Tabic 2 
Savings, Investment and GDP Growth Rates in Developing Asia 
(1971-80 and 1981-90) 
(in per cent) 
Period 1971-80 1981-90 
Korea 
Real GDP growth rate 9 8.8 
Gross domestic savings 22.3 30 
Grosss domestic investment 28.6 30.5 
Taiwan 
Real GDP growth rate 9.3 8.5 
Gross domestic savings 32.1 32.9 
Gross domestic investment 30.5 22.6 
Hong Kong 
Real GDP growth rate 9.3 7.2 
Gross domestic savings 28.4 31 
Gross domestic investment 27.8 28.2 
Singapore 
Real GDP growth rate 7.9 6.3 
Gross domestic savings 30 42.6 
Gross domestic investment 41.2 42.2 
Indonesia 
Real GDP growth rate 7.7 5.5 
Gross domestic savings 21.6 31.8 
Gross domestic investment 19.3 30.4 
Malaysia 
Real GDP growth rate 7.8 5.2 
Gross domestic savings 29.1 33 
Gross domestic investment 24.9 30.7 
Table 2 contd.. 
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Period 
Philippines 
Real GDP growth rate 
Gross domestic savings 
Gross domestic investment 
Thailand 
Real GDP growth rate 
Gross domestic savings 
Gross domestic investment 
Note: Grosss domestic savings and investment 
are expressed in per cent of GDP. 
Source: Asian Development Outlook (various issues). 
1971-80 1981-90 
6 
26.5 
27.8 
1 
22.3 
21.9 
7.9 
22.2 
25.3 
7.8 
24.6 
26.9 
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Table 3 
Interest Rate Regime, Incidence of Financial Reform and the Behaviour of 
Savings and Investment Efficiency (1971-80: period 1 vs. 1981-90: period 2) 
Economy Increase in 
savings ratio 
Increase in 
investment 
efficiency 
Yes/No 
Interest rate regime Financial 
(real rate: +ve/-ve reform 
relevant period) initiated 
(Yes/No 
Not applicable) 
Hong Kong Yes No -ve Not applicable 
Korea* Yes No -ve Yes 
Singapore Yes No +ve Not applicable 
Taiwan Yes Yes -ve Yes 
China** No Yes +ve Yes 
Indonesia*** Yes No -ve 
Malaysia Yes No +ve Yes 
Philippines**** No No +ve Yes 
Note: * Interest rate regime was -ve for some periods 
** Interest rate regime +ve in recent years 
*** For some distinct sub-period interest rate regime -ve 
**** Interest rate regime exhibits significant volatality 
Source: Islam and Chowdhuiy (1997) 
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Table 4 
Net Non-interest Income as a Share of Banks' Annual Gross Income 
(in per cent) 
1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 
France 
Germany 
Japan 
Switzerland 
UK 
USA 
16.0 16.2 
29.1 26.8 
17.8 13.9 
47.7 44.2 
n.a. n.a. 
24.0 24.6 
16.8 13.2 
24.8 25.9 
14.7 17.7 
46.5 45.7 
n.a. 35.6 
26.5 24.7 
14.1 14.4 
30.1 29.5 
21.1 19.7 
47.4 49.4 
34.5 36.3 
26.6 29.8 
29.8 30.4 
25.1 25.8 
51.6 47.1 
38.1 37.6 
30.2 30.1 
21.2 20.1 
36.0 35.7 
23.8 24.1 
50.9 49.1 
39.2 40.1 
31.8 32.8 
Source : Banks Under Stress, OECD (1992); pp. 125. 
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Table 5 
Capital Flows to Developing Countries and Asia 
(in US $ billion) 
Year 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 
I All developing countries 
1. Net resource flows 101.9 127.1 155.3 207.3 207.4 231.4 
2. Investment 28.7 42.6 60.7 113.9 115.0 112.3 
a) Foreign direct mvestment(net) 25.0 35.0 46.6 68.3 80.1 90.3 
b) Portfolio equity flows 3.7 7.6 14.1 45.6 34.9 22.0 
3. Debt 43.8 47.0 62.7 64.0 59.9 86.2 
a) Official creditors 28.5 28.0 23.1 23.6 16.1 31.4 
b) Private 15.3 19.0 39.6 40.4 43.8 54.8 
4. Grants 29.4 37.5 31.9 29.4 32.5 32.9 
II Developing Asia 
1. Net resource flows 38.3 45.4 62.8 83.2 99.1 120.8 
2. Investment 13.8 15.4 27.8 58.8 63.1 69.4 
a) Foreign direct lnvestment(net) 11.4 14.3 22.3 38.7 44.3 55.7 
b) Portfolio equity flows 2.4 1.1 5.5 20.1 18.8 13.7 
3. Debt 19.7 24.5 30.1 19.9 30.5 45.6 
a) Official creditors 10.7 11.6 10.3 11.2 8.9 19.9 
b) Private 9.0 12.9 19.8 8.7 21.6 34.7 
4. Grants 4.8 5.5 4.9 4.5 5.5 5.8 
5. FDI Asia excluding PRC 7.9 10.0 11.1 11.2 10.5 17.7 
Source : World Debt Tables (1996). 
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Table 6 
Capital Flows to Developing Countries and Asia 
(as per cent of net resource flows) 
Year 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 
I All developing countries 
1. Net resource flows 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
2. Investment 28.2 33.5 39.1 54.9 55.4 48.5 
a) Foreign direct investment(net) 24.5 27.5 30.0 32.9 38.6 39.0 
b) Portfolio equity flows 3.6 6.0 9.1 22.0 16.8 9.5 
3. Debt 43.0 37.0 40.4 30.9 28.9 37.3 
a) Official creditors 28.0 22.0 14.9 11.4 7.8 13.6 
b) Private 15.0 14.9 25.5 19.5 21.1 23.7 
4. Grants 28.9 29.5 20.5 14.2 15.7 14.2 
II Developing Asia 
1. Net resource flows 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
2. Investment 36.0 33.9 44.3 70.7 63.7 57.5 
a) Foreign direct mvestment(net) 29.8 31.5 35.5 46.5 44.7 46.1 
b) Portfolio equity flows 6.3 2.4 8.8 24.2 19.0 11.3 
3. Debt 51.4 54.0 47.9 23.9 30.8 37.7 
a) Official creditors 27.9 25.6 16.4 13.5 9.0 9.0 
b) Private 23.5 28.4 31.5 10.5 21.8 28.7 
4. Grants 12.5 12.1 7.8 5.4 5.5 4.8 
5. FDI Asia excluding PRC 20.6 22.0 17.7 13.5 10.6 14.7 
Source : Calculations based on Table 5. 
i 
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Table 7 
Types of Financial Regulation - Objectives and Key Policy Instruments 
Type of regulations Objectives Examples of key policy instruments 
Macroeconomic To maintain control 
over aggregate economic 
activity and maintain 
external and internal 
balance 
Allocative To influence the 
allocation of financial 
resources in favour of 
priority activities 
Structural To control the possible 
abuse of monopoly 
power by dominant firms 
Prudential To preserve the safet\' 
and soundness of indi-
vidual financial institu-
tions and sustain public 
confidence in systemic 
stability 
Organisational To ensure smooth 
functioning and 
integrity of financial 
markets and formation 
exchanges 
Protective To provide protection 
to users of financial 
services, especially 
consumers and non-
professional investors. 
Reserve requirements,direct credit and 
deposit ceilings, interest rate controls 
and restrictions on foreign capital 
Selective credit allocation, 
compulsory investment requirements, 
preferential interest rates 
Entry and merger controls, geographic 
and functional restrictions 
Authorisation criteria, minimum 
capital requirement, limit on the 
concentration of risks, reporting 
requirements 
Disclosure of market information, 
minimum technical standards, rule 
of market-making and participation 
Information disclosure to consumers, 
compensation funds, ombudsmen 
to investigate and resolve disputes 
Source : Vittas (1992). 
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Notes 
1. First, the services provided by the financial system 
are diverse: an efficient financial system guarantees 
the proper functioning of the payments system, 
ensures the mobilisation of savings and their 
channelling into investment, makes it possible to 
diversify risk, collects information and constantly 
evaluates the quality of investment projects. Second, 
some of these services - such as management of the 
payments system - are very much of the nature of 
public goods, which prevents their being taken into 
account by market prices. Lastly, compilation of such 
indicators is further complicated by the diversity of 
agents and institutions involved in the financial 
intermediation process. 
2. An indicator of the relative size of the financial 
system is the volume of fmancial intermediaries' 
liquid liabilities (measured in practice by M3 or M2) 
as a percentage of GDP which is also termed as 
financial depth or deepening ratio. 
3. This view should not be mistaken as akin to the 
monetarist doctrine a la Milton Friedman which 
regards increasing monetisation as necessary 
prerequisite for economic growth. On the contrary, 
the causality runs here in the reverse direction where 
real growth process generates demand for increasing 
monetisation. 
4. Saint-Paul (1993) analysed technological dualism, 
often found in developing countries, which stands for 
a diversification of technological risks in less 
productive technologies when it is not possible to 
diversify productive risks in modem sector and 
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thereby, in modern technologies due to the 
underdeveloped nature of the financial markets. 
5. Banks may also suffer from liquidity risks but 
because of law of large numbers banks' exposure to 
liquidity risks is generally lower than individual 
investors. 
6. Universal system of banking, as exercised in Japan 
and Germany, involved holding shares in the capital 
of enterprises and banks' representation in the 
companies' management boards. Hence it had 
comparative advantages over the equity finance when 
it came to the restructuring of enterprises and thereby, 
in reducing transaction costs and improvement in the 
investment quality. 
7. See Barandiran (1987), de Melo and Tybout (1986), 
Fry (1984 & 1985), Giovannini (1985), Hanna (1994) 
Islam & Chowdhury (1997) and Leff & Sato (1980). 
8. Financial fragility is defined as the deterioration of 
the financial intermediaries' balance-sheets over time 
owing to lower asset quality and lower net earnings. 
See Sen (1996b). 
9. Advocates of financial deregulation argue that 
financial institutions may tend to become risk lovers 
in the presence of a bail out mechanism which is 
widely prevalent. 
10. Demand driven explanation indicates expansion of 
financial sector fuelled by real economic growth 
whereas the latter is preceded by financial sector 
development in supply driven case. 
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11. See Cullis and Jones (1987) for an overview of the 
government failure argument 
12. Indonesia had to revert its financial reform in early 
eighties as it entailed some external costs in terms of 
macroeconomic instability.. For an overview of the 
Indonesian case see Cole & Slade (1992). 
13. A credit-based financial system need not necessarily 
be state dominated. 
14. Cited in Wade (1988). 
15. During 1991, non-bank financial intermediaries 
income as proportion of the gross bank income was 
41.1% in UK, 38.0% in US and 35.9% in Japan. See 
BIS (1990a). 
16. See OECD (1992). 
17. See OECD (1992). 
18. The empirical facts about bank profitability and 
gross income are based on OECD (1991). 
19. Real estate prices are important in the Japanese 
context as real estate is an important collateral for 
Japanese bank loan. A sharp drop in real estate price 
could force banks to demand higher collateral or a 
repayment of credit, resulting in higher bankruptcies. 
See Salomon Brothers (1991a). 
20. See Salomon Brothers (1991a). 
21. Banks fmanced mergers of 340 financial and 1044 
non-financial institutes in the OECD countries in 
1991. See Sen (1994). 
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22. See Euromoney, October 1989. 
23. See Salomon Brothers (1991b). 
24. See Salomon Brothers (1991b). 
25. See OECD (1992). 
26. In 1983 the US monetary authority introduced 
International Lending Supervisory Act (ILSA), which 
in effect created a creditors' cartel, to thwart the 
potential debt collapse of the US commercial banks. 
27. See World Bank (1991). 
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